Title: Aristotle’s sentimentalist ethical virtue
By Gösta Grönroos (Stockholm, Philosophy)
Date: Thursday March 18, 2021
Time: 1600-1730 (GMT+3)
This is an online seminar. To request the event link, please send a message to the department.
Abstract: In this lecture, I will argue that Aristotle’s ethical virtue (ἀρετὴ ἠθική) is an exclusively emotional disposition constitutive of practical wisdom, and that ethical virtue should be distinguished from the particular character virtues such as courage and justice (albeit moderation is intimately related to ethical virtue). Ethical virtue disposes the desires of the non-rational part of the soul not to impair the enjoyment in exercising character virtues. It disposes these desires to be measured, so that they can be forgone without distress or pain. The only way to distinguish between the virtuous and the enkratic person is with reference to their respective affective states. The enkratic person does not count as virtuous since she pained by having to forgo desires in the non-rational part of the soul, and cannot bring exercises of character virtues to completion.
About the speaker: https://philpeople.org/profiles/gosta-gronroos